By Max Born, H. S. Green
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131–133 below. 5 Cf. Carnap (1966a), p. 232: “The statement that empirical laws are derived from theoretical laws is an oversimplification. It is not possible to derive them directly because a theoretical law contains theoretical terms, whereas an empirical law contains only observable terms. ” THE EMPIRICIST CONCEPTION OF PROGRESS 23 One approach to the solution of problems of this sort has been to suggest means of eliminating theoretical terms in such a way as to retain the empirical consequences of the theory, as conceived on the empiricist view.
15 16 CHAPTER 3 should be thought to confirm a law, but statements of the form (Fa ∧ Ga). 17 And the verification of such statements is no more problematic than is the verification of Popper’s basic statements. But the problem of confirmation, as described in the previous chapter, still remains, and so we might investigate whether Popper has succeeded in solving or avoiding it via the employment of his own notion of corroboration. What is being required of him here then is the presentation of a conception not involving the notion of induction, in terms of which we can understand how the passing of (severe) tests should make more reasonable the acceptance of a particular scientific law.
As was mentioned in the previous chapter, the notion of induction may be seen to have two distinct applications: one to the discovery of new laws, and one to the justification of claims that a particular law has in fact been found. 13 ––––– 9 Cf. g. Popper (1962), pp. 390f. Popper (1934), p. 104. 11 For a similar criticism see Deutscher (1968), p. 280; see also Duhem (1906), p. 185. 12 Note that the present criticism does not preclude some sort of testability criterion of demarcation, but relates directly to Popper’s falsifiability criterion as it is to be understood in the context of his conception of scientific laws.