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Discusses a few of the theories of recognition from assorted views: mental, neurophysiological and philosophical. Theories concerning the interplay of discomfort, schizophrenia, the mind and the frightened procedure with realization are incorporated. additionally encompasses a dialogue of the relative benefits of different theories including the most recent information from the experimental disciplines.


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The only trouble is that, apart from hermeneutics, they’re really just meaningless ‘squiggles and squoggles’ (as Searle 1980 would call them). The same is true of neurological and behavioural states that are interpretable as pain states. Abstain from hermeneutics and they are just inputs, nerve janglings and outputs. Thus, all such cases just amount to self-fulfilling prophecy. When you read off the interpretation that you projected as vindication of the fact that you have explained a conscious state, you keep forgetting that it’s all done with mirrors because the interpretation was smuggled in by you in the first place.

However, if I accidentally catch its tail in the guillotine door and it jumps like crazy, I will at once assume that it had the conscious experience of pain. So belief is not part of the problem. Shoemaker: I wasn’t saying that beliefs are sufficient for consciousness, I was saying that one case of consciousness is being conscious that you believe 22 Discussion something. Tom Nagel said earlier (this volume) that there are cases of consciousness that don’t involve introspective consciousness, and I agree with that.

We know they can see through quite different kinds of retinal organization. We don’t know what you necessarily have to have inside the head that will allow you to have colour vision. You can tell that only from behavioural data. Dennett: I quite agree. But I am suggesting an informational analysis of just what’s coming into the organism, what’s available to the organism to work with. Let’s take simple cases. It’s pretty clear that a pen does not have colour vision, and that follows from ‘physiological facts’ about this pen and its circumstances.

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